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Is There a Legal Duty to Address World Poverty?* 
MARGOT E. SALOMON** 
Abstract 
States are reticent to support the idea that they have human rights obligations to people other than their 
own. However decades of United Nations consideration and human rights standard-setting in the area 
of international cooperation have advanced interpretations of the obligation whereby economic and 
other policies should be designed in such a way as to avoid causing injury to the interests of 
developing States and to the rights of their people, and, moreover, should actively seek to address 
existing deprivations. This latter obligation to fulfil socio-economic rights elsewhere gives rise to a 
host of important legal issues that provide the focus for this article. Should we understand the 
obligations to be those of individual States or can we speak of collective legal obligations in this area? 
Is the extraterritorial obligation to fulfil socio-economic rights limited to the transfer of financial 
resources, and if not what else might it entail? Are they best framed as secondary obligations triggered 
only if the rights-holder’s own State is unable or unwilling to fulfil them or as simultaneous 
obligations? If, as per the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and its 
monitoring Committee we recognise capacity as a basis to assist, how might the obligations among all 
those States with capacity be divided? In complying with these positive obligations of international 
assistance and cooperation what would constitute an unreasonable cost on the part of a State acting 
extraterritorially? In exploring these questions, this paper offers insights from the author’s 
membership in the Drafting Committee of the 2011 Maastricht Principles on the Extraterritorial 
Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and presents the current state 
of legal play. 
Keywords 
Socio-economic rights, globalisation, extraterritorial obligations, international cooperation, Maastricht 
Principles 2011. 
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Bringing in the law 
Decent people everywhere would recognise the existence of a duty to help those in need. Indeed, many 
States regularly take the high ground, emphasising their moral obligation of international assistance 
motivated by a sense of solidarity to the deprived of the world. This philanthropic intuition 
notwithstanding, there are good reasons to suggest that the duties certain States owe to the world’s 
poor go beyond the realm of charity to include obligations as a matter of international law. 
There exists a general obligation for States to take action, separately, and jointly through 
international cooperation, to fulfil the economic, social and cultural rights of persons outside of their 
respective territories. This obligation is found in the United Nations (UN) Charter which requires 
cooperation among Member States in the achievement of human rights by all, higher standards of 
living, and economic and social progress and development.1 This wide-ranging obligation to cooperate 
internationally in the realisation of human rights that States owe to each other is reinforced by the 
obligations of ‘international assistance and cooperation’ explicitly to realise economic, social and 
cultural rights provided for in the 1966 UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR),2 as well as the obligation of international cooperation to secure the socio-economic 
rights of children, as found in the UN Convention on the Right of the Child (CRC).3 From the 
assertion in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 of an entitlement to an international 
order in which human rights can be realised, to the 1970s call by the General Assembly for a New 
International Economic Order, to the 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development, and the 
Millennium Declaration affirmation of a shared responsibility to address poverty, it should be 
uncontroversial that international cooperation aimed at ensuring the exercise in the first instance of 
basic human rights, can be found among the traditional sources of international law.4  
Before moving on it may be helpful to highlight that human rights are protected in ‘living 
instruments’. The interpretation of the treaties that codify rights should be dynamic; in order to be 
compatible with their object and purpose they must be interpreted in light of present-day conditions. 
Today, under the European Convention on Human Rights for example, the concept of degrading 
treatment may be interpreted to include racial discrimination; the right to respect for private life 
requires the legal recognition of the new identity of post-operative transsexuals; and environmental 
pollution may result in a breach of the same article. Nowadays under the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, the ‘peoples’ to which the collective rights provisions apply include indigenous 
peoples, just as an ‘evolutionary interpretation’ by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of the 
right to property under the American Convention on Human Rights applies also to the communal 
property rights of indigenous peoples to the lands they currently inhabit. Indeed, the Inter-American 
                                                     
1 Charter arts 55, 56. 
2 ICESCR art 2(1); see also, 11(1), 11(2), 15(4), and arts 22 and 23. This article uses ‘economic, social and cultural rights’ 
and ‘socio-economic rights’ interchangeably. 
3 CRC arts 4, 23(4), 24(4), 28(3). 
4 In this article we focus on treaties, drawing particularly on developments pertaining to article 2(1) of ICESCR. For 
consideration of a general obligation to cooperate in the respect and observance of human rights, including socio-
economic rights, see ME Salomon, Global Responsibility for Human Rights: World Poverty and the Development of 
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) Ch 4. On the matter of basic human rights there is 
widespread acceptance among States parties of the approach adopted by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR) recognising an immediate obligation to realise the ‘minimum essential levels of each of the 
[Covenant] rights’ and of the corresponding ‘core obligations’. CESCR, General Comment No 3, The Nature of States 
Parties’ Obligations (art. 2, para. 1, of the Covenant) (5th session, 1990) UN Doc E/1991/23 annex III, para. 10 (1991); 
see also, CESCR, General Comment No 15, The Right to Water (arts. 11 and 12 of the Covenant) (29th session, 2002) 
UN Doc E/C.12/2002/11, para 37. 
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Court has stated that when taking into account applicable norms of interpretation, including as 
provided in the Convention itself, a restrictive interpretation of rights is precluded.5 That varied 
interpretations were unlikely to have been in the minds of the drafters represent no bar to what the 
remit of a right protects today nor what the corresponding obligations might entail.  
When it comes to obligations in the realm of world poverty even less judicial activism is required 
since the relevant provisions explicitly anticipate not only territorial obligations, but also 
extraterritorial obligations among States parties to see realised socio-economic rights outside their own 
borders. These include, for example, rights to an adequate standard of living, to food, and to 
healthcare. The provisions providing for obligations of international cooperation in the area of 
economic, social and cultural rights, such as article 2(1) of ICESCR the main human rights treaty on 
the subject, are shaped most notably by economic globalisation and what it might now demand of 
them. ICESCR Article 2(1) provides that ‘Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take 
steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and 
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant …’. Today, what is required of many 
States under this and related provisions include obligations of positive action to fulfil the rights of 
people in far off places. This is because they can and because under conditions of economic 
interdependence some States simply may not be able to ensure even the minimum essential rights of 
their people on their own. 
Extraterritorial obligations apply to all three levels of the tripartite model of obligations employed 
in this area. International human rights law imposes obligations on States acting separately and jointly 
to refrain from doing harm to people beyond their own borders (‘obligation to respect’ human rights), 
as well as obligations, under certain conditions, to protect people outside of their territory from harms 
at the hands of non-State actors, including corporate entities (‘obligation to protect’ human rights). As 
will have become clear, another area of extraterritorial international human rights law that is giving 
rise both to important legal developments as well as unresolved legal questions is that of positive 
obligations of States to fulfil economic, social and cultural rights beyond their borders. The ‘obligation 
to fulfil’ human rights elsewhere, which forms the basis of this paper, forces a re-examination of a 
number of central human rights tenets, most recently brought together in the Maastricht Principles on 
the Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The 
Maastricht Principles were adopted in September 2011 by forty leading human rights experts and 
reflect a consolidation of jurisprudence on the topic and a clarification of the legal parameters of the 
subject to date.6 Drawing on the Principles themselves and from insights gleaned as a member of the 
six-person Drafting Committee, this paper focuses on the legal duty to address world poverty and what 
international law might require of States today. 
The scope of extraterritorial obligations 
When it comes to human rights obligations beyond borders there are two quite clearly defined legal 
dimensions. On the hand, there are obligations that relate to the acts and omissions of a State, within 
                                                     
5 IACtHR, Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community Case, 31 August 2001, Series C No. 79, para 148. 
6 Signatories include current and former members of UN international human rights treaty bodies, former and current 
Special Rapporteurs of the UN Human Rights Council, along with scholars and legal advisers of leading non-
governmental organizations. The Principles can be found at: 
 http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/web/Institutes/MaastrichtCentreForHumanRights.htm. See further, O De Schutter, A 
Eide, A Khalfan, M Orellana, ME Salomon and I Seiderman, ‘Commentary to the Maastricht Principles on the 
Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ 34 Human Rights Quarterly 4 
(forthcoming, 2012).  
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or beyond its territory, that have effects on the enjoyment of human rights outside of that State’s 
territory.7 A State, (or group of States acting collectively), that adopts agricultural subsidies 
undercutting farmers elsewhere and negatively impacting on their right to an adequate standard of 
living, may be in breach of its extraterritorial obligation to respect the rights of developing world 
farmers as a result of a law or policy taken within its territory that has external effects. As for conduct 
undertaken beyond a State’s territory that may amount to a breach of its extraterritorial obligation, the 
situation of belligerent occupation offers one example whereby the occupying power is required to 
respect, protect and fulfil the rights to work, to health, to education and to an adequate standard of 
living.8 The requirement to avoid negative effects on the exercise of economic, social and cultural 
rights beyond borders makes prior assessments by the State of the extraterritorial impacts of its laws, 
policies and practices of paramount importance.9 The responsibility of each State is engaged where 
nullification or impairment is a foreseeable result of its conduct10 and the international responsibility 
for a breach of its obligation will be assessed on the basis of what the authorities knew or should have 
known. 
The second legal dimension, and that which forms the focus of this paper, applies to States’ 
positive obligation of international cooperation to fulfil socio-economic rights universally. That human 
rights obligations apply to relations among States is not alien to the international law of human rights, 
notwithstanding that classically international human rights obligations focus primarily on the 
regulation of the State in its conduct towards the people within its territory.11 These ‘obligations of a 
global character’12 have a strong inter-state component, but under international human rights law 
people remain the rights-holders and are the ultimate beneficiaries of any endeavour among States to 
give rights effect. 
Thus a State has obligations to respect, protect and fulfil economic, social and cultural rights in 
certain situations that occur outside its national territory. As such, the scope of jurisdiction covers 
situations where a State exercises effective control outside of its own territory and over which its 
conduct brings about foreseeable effects on the enjoyment of these rights, whether undertaken within 
or outside its territory. Where human rights treaties impose obligations requiring extraterritorial action 
to fulfil socio-economic rights, the Maastricht Principles determine that jurisdiction will also attach 
when a State, acting separately or jointly, is in a position to exercise decisive influence or to take 
measures to realise economic, social and cultural rights beyond its borders.13 Whereas jurisdiction has 
traditionally served as a doctrinal bar to the recognition and discharge of human rights obligations 
extraterritorially,14 not least as a result of the outcomes engendered by an integrated global economy, 
the recognition under international law of a State’s prescriptive authority to act beyond its borders is 
based on its obligation to advance human rights in the world.  
                                                     
7 Maastricht Principle 8(a). 
8 See for example, CESCR Concluding Observations on Israel, UN Doc E/C.12/ISR/CO/3 (2011) para. 8. For a concise 
overview and analysis of the Principles generally see, M Salomon and I Seiderman, ‘The Maastricht Principles on the 
Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, Special Section: International 
Law, Human Rights, and the Global Economy, Guest Editor: M Salomon, 4 Global Policy 3 (forthcoming, November 
2012). http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/ 
9 Maastricht Principle 14. 
10 Ibid., 13. 
11 See, ME Salomon, ‘Legal Cosmopolitanism and the Normative Contribution of the Right to Development’ in SP Marks 
(ed), Implementing the Right to Development: The Role of International Law (Harvard School of Public Health/Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung, 2008) p 17. 
12 Maastricht Principle 8(b). 
13 Ibid., 9(c). 
14 See, De Schutter et al, ‘Commentary to the Maastricht Principles’. 
Margot E. Salomon 
 
4 
 
Obligations of international cooperation to fulfil socio-economic rights universally 
Economic globalisation has revealed that socio-economic rights cannot be properly secured in the 
world today exclusively through the ad hoc, unilateral or bilateral effort of States. Instead, the global 
structural environment must be conducive to their realisation. As noted above in our consideration of 
the legal sources of international cooperation obligations, decades of international law-making have 
reaffirmed the importance of international arrangements that address poverty and underdevelopment 
and support the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights universally. Giving effect to these 
obligations would require the appropriate management of the international regulatory spheres of trade, 
investment, taxation, finance, as well as environmental and development cooperation. The elaboration, 
interpretation, application and regular review of treaties and standards by States, including as members 
of international organisations, would play an important role in addressing the structural impediments 
to securing human rights for all.15 In sum, the very design of existing global arrangements at worst 
causes the deprivation that exists today and at best has failed adequately to remedy it.16 Through the 
elaboration of obligations of international cooperation international human rights law has offered a 
response. 
By fleshing out the content of obligations of international cooperation (including obligations of 
‘international assistance and cooperation’ as expressed in article 2(1) ICESCR), we see, significantly, 
that international assistance and cooperation is not limited to the transfer of financial resources, as is 
often argued by industrialised States. High-income States tend to equate the obligation with resource 
transfer and then to take the position that they have no legal obligation to transfer resources abroad in 
order to address need, only a moral duty. The requirement to ensure that a whole host of international 
regulatory spheres contribute to an international environment enabling of human rights militates 
against that narrow interpretation of the norm.  
Moreover, States may in fact have legal obligations to transfer money in order to address world 
poverty. Since the 1970s, high-income States have repeatedly committed to transferring 0.7% gross 
national income (GNI) in official development assistance, which four decades later may be binding 
upon each of them despite their original intent merely to issue political declarations. True, we would 
be hard-pressed to defend the position that there exists a legally binding obligation for a given State to 
provide any particular form of material assistance to any other specific State(s), however this current 
limitation does not preclude the existence of the obligation to make funds available, along with a joint 
obligation among States collectively to secure adequate funds to address poverty globally. This latter 
requirement is all the more stringent given that some aspects of the obligation to cooperate 
internationally in fulfilling economic, social and cultural rights globally cannot be achieved by any 
one State on its own. It may be worth emphasing that a State in need may not refuse to discharge its 
own (territorial) obligations by invoking the failed conduct of other States in assisting. 
Importantly, obligations of international cooperation are not limited to industrialised States but to 
all those with capacity and/or resources: in the words of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR) ‘those States in position to assist’. Any State possessing capacity and any 
variety of resources – economic, technical, technological, influence in decision-making – must harness 
those assets also towards fulfilling economic, social and cultural rights elsewhere in the world.17 
Taking account of varied forms of capacity and influence signals that there is a wide range of States 
with potential obligations. It is also uncontroversial that any State in a position to assist retains its 
                                                     
15 Maastricht Principle 29. See also, CESCR, Statement on the World Food Crisis (40th session, 2008), UN Doc 
E/C.12/2008/1, para 9 (2008). 
16 Salomon, Global Responsibility for Human Rights, Ch. 5. 
17 Maastricht Principle 31. 
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obligations to fulfil rights within its own territory to the ‘maximum of its available resources’.18 
Finally, it should be noted that there are important procedural components of a State’s obligation to 
cooperate, including devising a system of international coordination and allocation that would 
facilitate the discharging of these obligations of a global character19 and the requirement to cooperate 
in the mobilisation of resources necessary for the universal fulfilment of economic, social and cultural 
rights where existing resources are inadequate.20 Thus, a State is not relieved of its obligation in this 
area because it lacks resources: it could be held internationally responsible for not having worked 
towards the creation of a practical system of cooperation and for failing to have sought to mobilise the 
necessary resources globally.21 International human rights law distinguishes obligations of conduct 
from obligations of result. 
(Un)resolved issues of the legal duty to address world poverty  
The answer to the question as to whether there is a legal duty to address world poverty is: yes. 
However this fact takes us only half the way there. Giving meaning to the duty requires clarity as 
regards at least five central issues and only some move beyond containing anything more than 
emergent doctrinal content. 
Issue 1: Should we understand these obligations to be those of individual States or can we speak of 
truly collective legal obligations in this area?  
In addition to obligations best given effect in our contemporary world through international assistance 
and cooperation, there may be obligations that can only be fulfilled collectively, for example meeting 
global need that requires resources beyond that of any one State. Securing the estimated 1 per cent of 
the combined GNIs of high-income countries necessary to meet financial shortfalls in redressing 
poverty is a truly collective endeavour. That said, the international legal responsibility of each relevant 
State is determined individually, on the basis of its own conduct and by reference to its own 
international obligations.22 
Issue 2: Is the obligation to fulfil socio-economic rights limited to the transfer of resources, and if 
not what else might it entail?  
The transfer of financial resources is only one possible aspect of giving effect to this obligation. There 
exists an obligation for States to contribute to the creation of an international environment conducive 
to the realisation of human rights and those requirements relate to the legal and policy arenas of 
international trade, investment and finance, among other areas.  
Three further matters are central to the proper execution of obligations of international cooperation. 
Their clarification would serve to determine the parameters of these obligations including for the 
                                                     
18 ICESCR, art 2(1).  
19 Maastricht Principle 30. 
20 Ibid., 31. 
21 ‘The Committee notes that the phrase "to the maximum of its available resources" was intended by the drafters of the 
Covenant to refer to both the resources existing within a State and those available from the international community 
through international cooperation and assistance.’ CESCR, General Comment No 3, The Nature of States Parties’ 
Obligations, para 13. 
22 UN International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
with Commentaries’, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-third Session (53rd session, 
2001), UN GAOR, Supp No 10 at 43, UN Doc A/56/10 (2001) Commentary to art 47, p 125 
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purposes of determining what constitutes a breach, as well as address areas of recurrent diplomatic 
apprehension.  
Issue 3: Is the obligation of States to contribute to fulfilling economic, social and cultural rights 
elsewhere best framed as secondary (subsidiary), triggered only if the rights-holder’s own State is 
unable or unwilling to fulfil them? Or should obligations of the external States be understood as 
simultaneous obligations? 
While it is uncontroversial that the extraterritorial obligations to ‘respect’ and ‘protect’ economic, 
social and cultural rights elsewhere exist alongside those of other States, international action to fulfil 
socio-economic rights by States other than the rights-holders own, it has been argued, is but a 
secondary duty where the ‘primary’ duty-bearer is unable or unwilling to fulfil its obligations to 
ensure a right to an adequate living or the right to food etc. This approach has clear limitations under 
current realities. For one, socio-economic rights remain so dramatically unmet globally that 
complementary duties among external States to give effect to obligations that will serve, in the first 
instance, to remedy the state of affairs must be said to exist.23 Similarly, the restructuring and constant 
monitoring of systemic and structural deficiencies of the global economic order so that it supports 
socio-economic rights cannot be understood as constituting conditional duties. Next, where they exist, 
the assignment of secondary duties to external States in the area of human rights should reasonably be 
determined on the basis of the failure of the rights-holders to exercise their rights, and not based on 
the reason their own State has failed to meet its obligations. Put differently, the significance of 
distinguishing between whether the rights-holder’s own State is unable or unwilling to comply with its 
obligations is important in determining that State’s own responsibility for failure to meet its human 
rights obligations – inability giving rise to possible defences that might preclude wrongfulness. 
However, the distinction bears no relevance as regards assigning the duty to act to other States that can 
help: that is rightfully determined exclusively on the basis of the failure of the rights-holders to 
exercise their rights.24 It is that failure that gives rise to obligations on States in a position to assist. 
Issue 4: Where capacity determines the existence of a duty-bearer (unlike, for instance, where 
causation or historical responsibility might point to the duty-bearing State), how are the obligations 
among all those States with capacity to be divided? 
This is a complex topic that has recently begun to receive the attention of legal scholars. In short, in 
the absence of any precise systems of international coordination and allocation under international 
human rights law that would facilitate the discharging of obligations of a global character, the current 
minimum requirement is that States have an obligation to devise a suitable international division of 
responsibilities necessary to give effect to the obligation to cooperate in fulfilling economic, social and 
cultural rights throughout the world. As has been noted, the aspect of the obligation that can clearly be 
ascertained at present is a procedural one: the establishment of a system of negotiated burden-sharing 
that could allow for this obligation to be meaningfully discharged.25 
                                                     
23 See, Salomon, Global Responsibility for Human Rights, Ch 5. 
24 See, L Wenar, ‘Responsibility and Severe Poverty’ in TW Pogge (ed), Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right: Who 
owes what to the very poor? (OUP/UNESCO, 2007) p 255, at 265.  
25 See, De Schutter et al, ‘Commentary to the Maastricht Principles’. 
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Issue 5: In complying with these positive obligations of international assistance and cooperation 
what would constitute an unreasonable cost on the part of a State acting extraterritorially?  
For immediate purposes the important point to highlight is that while the relevant State in a position to 
assist retains the obligation to fulfil economic, social and cultural rights within its territory, 
irrespective of whether socio-economic rights have been fully realised for persons located on a State’s 
own territory it could still be said to have positive obligations to fulfil the human rights of people 
outside of its borders. The determination as to what constitutes the ‘adequate and reasonable’ use of its 
capacity and available resources towards the immediate and/or progressive realisation of rights at 
home as well as abroad should be formed on the basis of an objective determination.26  
While we have come some way in making international human rights law responsive to global 
deprivation, we have further to go in refining the content of extraterritorial obligations when it comes 
to socio-economic rights. Conceptual challenges and doctrinal gaps notwithstanding, there are 
undoubtedly legal obligations to the world’s poor. To see justice served however, there is considerable 
work yet to do. 
 
                                                     
26 For detailed consideration of options as to how it can be determined that a State has met its domestic obligations so as to 
give rise to extraterritorial obligations, see ME Salomon, ‘Deprivation, Causation, and the Law of International 
Cooperation’ in M Langford, W Vandenhole, M Scheinin and W van Genugten (eds), Global Justice, State Duties: The 
Extra-Territorial Scope of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law (forthcoming, Cambridge 
University Press, 2013); G Ooms and R Hammonds, ‘Taking up Daniels’ Challenge: The Case for Global Health Justice’, 
12 Health and Human Rights 1 (2010) p 29, at 36 ; and A Khalfan, ‘Division of Responsibility between States’ in M 
Langford, et al (eds), Global Justice, State Duties. 
  
 
